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Discounting future costs and benefits is often defended on the ground that our
descendants will be richer. Simply to treat the future as better off, however, is to
commit an ecological fallacy. Even if our descendants are better off when we av-
erage across climate change scenarios, this cannot justify discounting costs and
benefits in possible states of the world in which they are not. Giving due weight to
catastrophe scenarios requires energetic action against climate change.In recent years concern has grown that runaway climate change could
mean disaster. Martin Weitzman estimates a roughly 5 percent chance
of a rise in global temperatures of more than ten degrees Celsius over
the next two centuries in the absence of energetic intervention, with a
chance of roughly 1 percent that it could go over twenty—changes which
would pose “an extreme threat to human civilization and global ecology as
we now know it, even if it might not necessarily mean the end ofHomo sa-
piens as a species.”1 Provided that they did not lead to our extinction, these
losses would burdenmany generations of future people. A vast amount of
expected utility is at stake, even if the probability of catastrophe is low.* I thank participants at workshops and conferences in Salamanca, Graz, Frankfurt,
Lille, Ithaca, Cardiff, and London for comments and advice—especially Elizabeth Baldwin,
Simon Dietz, Anja Karnein, Paul Kelleher, Antony Millner, and Kian Mintz-Woo—two
anonymous referees, and the editors of Ethics.
1. Martin L.Weitzman, “OnModeling and Interpreting the Economics of Catastrophic
Climate Change,” Review of Economics and Statistics 91 (2009): 1–19, 1; Martin L. Weitzman,
“Fat-Tailed Uncertainty in the Economics of Catastrophic Climate Change,” Review of Envi-
ronmental Economics and Policy 5 (2011): 275–92, 282.
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AOne might think that economics, with its roots in the utilitarian tra-
dition, would give this great weight. Yet some prominent economists have
recommended only modest near-term measures to mitigate climate
change. When the British government’s 2006 Stern Review on the Economics
of Climate Change called for energetic action, its conclusions were attacked
as extreme. Perhaps the most common criticism was that the Stern Review
had employed an inappropriately low discount rate, giving too much
weight to costs and benefits in the future. William Nordhaus presented
a reductio ad absurdum:2
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ll use Wrinkle : A “wrinkle” in the climate will reduce world consumption
of goods and services by a tiny amount starting in 2200, but this loss
can be prevented by timely intervention today. How great a sacrifice
would be justified in order to do so?“Using the Review’s growth projections,” Nordhaus charged, “the Review
would justify reducing per capita consumption for one year today from
$10,000 to $4,400 in order to prevent a reduction of consumption from
$130,000 to $129,870 starting two centuries hence and continuing at
that rate forever after.”2
Nordhaus was describing what Derek Parfit calls a “Rawls-Scanlon
case.” In these situations, made famous by John Rawls and T. M. Scanlon,
“we can either save one person from some great burden, or give much
smaller benefits to many other people, who are all much better off.”3 Ex-
amples include the following:
1. Chocolates for the Well-off: By allowing a single person to starve, we
can give one chocolate each to a very large number of well-off
people. Should we do it?
2. World Cup: Jones has had an accident in a TV station that is cur-
rently broadcasting the World Cup and is suffering agonizing
pain. Should we interrupt the broadcast to rescue him at the
price of frustrating hundreds of millions of soccer fans?. William D. Nordhaus, “A Review of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate
e,” Journal of Economic Literature 45 (2007): 686–702, 696.
. Derek Parfit, On What Matters, ed. Samuel Scheffler (Oxford: Oxford University
2011), 2:246.Chocolates for theWell-off is based on an example in Roger Crisp, “Equality,
ty, and Compassion,” Ethics 113 (2003): 745–63, 754. I have borrowed Yitzak Benbaji’s
or the case (“Sufficiency or Priority?,” European Journal of Philosophy 14 [2006]: 327–48,
30). World Cup is from T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA:
ap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998), 235. Blue and the Many is a composite of
ples in Alistair Norcross, “ComparingHarms:Headaches andHumanLives,” Philosophy
ublic Affairs 26 (1997): 135–67; John Broome, “All Goods Are Relevant,” in Summary
res of Population Health: Concepts, Ethics, Measurement, and Applications, ed. Christopher
urray et al. (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2002), 727–29, 728; and Parfit, On
Matters, 2:246–47. The name is Parfit’s.
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A3. Blue and the Many: If the National Health Service (NHS) can ei-
ther spare Blue a year of severe pain or relieve the day-long mi-
graine headaches of a large number of people, how many of the
latter would be needed to make relieving the headaches the bet-
ter choice?
These cases reflect a familiar worry about utilitarianism: since it allows
the aggregation of costs and benefits, it can justify placing great burdens on
some in order to bring small benefits to others. Nordhaus’s “wrinkle exper-
iment” is a version of this problem: unless future costs and benefits are se-
verely discounted, utilitarianism implies that the prospect of small benefits
to a vast number of the rich (our descendants) could justify imposing se-
vere sacrifices on the poor (ourselves). This “argument from excessive sac-
rifice”4—that giving equal weight to future costs and benefits would impose
intolerable obligations on the present generation—has been one of the
most influential arguments for the economic practice of discounting. “If
there were no time preference,”writes KennethArrow, “what would the op-
timal solution be? Each unit sacrificed would yield a finite utility loss to the
first generation, but to compensate, there would be a gain, however small,
to each of an infinity of generations. . . . Given any investment, short of the
entire income, a still greater investment would be preferred.” As a justifica-
tion for a pure rate of time preference—which accords greater importance
to costs and benefits because they arrive sooner—Arrow invokes Samuel
Scheffler’s concept of an “agent-centered prerogative,” according to which
agents can defensibly give extra weight to their own interests.5
Discounting as usually practiced, however, fails to solve either Nord-
haus’s or Arrow’s paradox. Even if increasing the Stern Review’s discount
rate of roughly 1.4 percent to Nordhaus’s preferred 4 percent avoids
the conclusion that we should sacrifice more than half of next year’s in-
come inWrinkle,6 to revive the problem we need only stipulate that more
people will benefit. Consider the following:4
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ll use WrinkleDS : Between now and the time in which Nordhaus’s wrinkle
appears in 2200, human beings will be shrunk to the height of five
inches, as in the movie Downsizing, enabling the earth to support a
much larger population. How great a sacrifice would be justified to
prevent the wrinkle now?. Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987), 484.
. Kenneth J. Arrow, “Discounting, Morality, and Gaming,” in Discounting and Intergen-
al Equity, ed. Paul R. Portney and John Weyant (Washington, DC: Resources for the
e, 1999), 13–21, 14.
. William D. Nordhaus, A Question of Balance: Weighing the Options on Global Warming
s (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 10; Olivier Godard, “Time Discount-
d Long-Run Issues: The Controversy Raised by the Stern Review of the Economics of
te Change,” OPEC Energy Review 33 (2009): 1–22, 4.
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ASo long as world population were more than 108,000 times that of to-
day, cost-benefit analysis would recommend the sacrifice, even if the $130
gained by maintaining consumption at $130,000 instead of $129,870 were
a one-off.7 The Stakhanovite investment rates that Arrow hopes to avert
would also then be justified.8 Yet surely both authors mean to claim that
these sacrifices would not be required howevermany future people stood
to gain. If discounting is to yield this conclusion, it must be understood
differently.
This article probes the ethics underpinning Nordhaus’s and Arrow’s
arguments. It argues that an agent-centered prerogative can justify refus-
ing to sacrifice oneself for any number of people whowould in any case be
much better off. Costs and benefits to everyone else should be discounted
to a limited extent, at most. Economists commonly assume that economic
growth will leave future generations richer than the present one, in spite
of climate change. Even the Stern Review assumed a 1.3 percent base rate
of growth, leading to accusations that it demanded too much of the pres-
ent generation. “It is a peculiar feature of the Review,” wrote a group of
critics, “that while forecasting that people in the future will be vastly richer
than today, it also proposes that the present generation should make sub-
stantial new sacrifices on behalf of these more prosperous generations. It
is as though, looking back two hundred years . . . we claimed that people
living in the early days of industrialisation ought to have made sacrifices
on behalf of those living today, even though we are rich beyond the
dreams of anyone in those distant times.”9 In fact, as Thomas Schelling
noted, some members of future generations—and particularly victims
of climate change—will be poorer than thepresent-day inhabitants of rich
countries. To discount costs and benefits to these people on the ground
that future people will be much richer on average is to commit an ecolog-
ical fallacy—that is to say, treating a statistic that describes a group in the
aggregate as if it described its individualmembers. That a group enjoys an
average per capita level of consumption does not imply that this is the
level that each member, or even the average member, enjoys.10 Neverthe-
less, Schelling suggested that given the expected growth of GDP in the7. At a 4 percent rate of discount, the value of $130 in two hundred years is 130/(1 1
0.04)2005 $0.05. Then, $0.05  108,0005 $5400, the per capita loss to present-day people
from the sacrifice.
8. See Stephen M. Gardiner, A Perfect Moral Storm: The Ethical Tragedy of Climate Change
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 294.
9. Ian Byatt et al., “The Stern Review: A Dual Critique. Part II: Economic Aspects,”
World Economics 7 (2006): 199–229, 214; Nordhaus, “Review of the Stern Review,” 694.
10. Thomas C. Schelling, “Intergenerational Discounting,” Energy Policy 23 (1995):
395–401, 398; Jerry Ratcliffe, “The Ecological Fallacy,” April 27, 2015, http://www
.jratcliffe.net/blog/the-ecological-fallacy/. Schelling’s description of this as a “fallacy of
composition” was a misnomer, as I discuss below.
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Acoming decades, resourcesmight be better spent on poverty alleviation in
the present—an argument that writers like Bjørn Lomborg have pressed
energetically.11
What Schelling overlooked is that wemust also distinguish amongpos-
sible states of the world. Inmost scenarios envisioned by economists, future
generations in the aggregate are richer—and, implicitly, better off. This as-
sumption may seem optimistic—and clearly would not hold for future
nonhumans.12 But even if we grant it, it does not justify discounting future
damages away. We can defensibly disregard costs and benefits to people
whowill bemuch better off. In at least a few scenarios, however,most future
people are worse off. To treat them as if they will be better off because, av-
eraged across a set of scenarios, future people are better off is to commit
another ecological fallacy. Assume that many economists’ optimistic assess-
ment of the odds is right, and that there is—say—only a 1 percent chance
that climate change will be so bad as to impoverish the lives of our descen-
dants. The expected number of people impoverished—understood as the
number of future individuals multiplied by their chance of impoverish-
ment—is nonetheless enormous. There is no excuse for ignoring these
costs—or for foot-dragging on climate change.
I. IS THE APPEAL TO A PREROGATIVE NEEDED?
The force of Nordhaus’s “wrinkle experiment” comes from our feeling
that there must be something wrong with any analysis that implies that
we could be obliged to submit to deprivation and even death (let us call
it “the sacrifice”) in order to prevent a large number of rich people from
suffering a minor reduction in consumption. Can this problem be solved
without appealing to pure time preference?
We might think that the sacrifice would not in fact make the world a
better place, that it would be better if we did not make it. On this view,
there is something wrong with the value theory underpinning the utilitar-
ian judgment. It might seem that if the Stern Review’s discount rate recom-
mended the sacrifice inWrinkle, or unreasonable rates of investment, the
problem was insufficient concern about how benefits are distributed.
Partha Dasgupta suggests that the solution is not pure time preference,
but for discounting to give greater weight to equality.13 Nevertheless, such
weighting would not be absolute. While it might avoid implying that the11. Schelling, “Intergenerational Discounting,” 399–400; Bjørn Lomborg, Cool It: The
Skeptical Environmentalist’s Guide to Global Warming (London: Marshall Cavendish, 2010).
12. James Brander, review of The Skeptical Environmentalist, by Bjørn Lomborg, Journal
of Economic Literature 40 (2002): 972–74, 973; Wayne Hsiung and Cass R. Sunstein, “Climate
Change and Animals,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 155 (2007): 1695–1740.
13. Partha Dasgupta, “Discounting Climate Change,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 37
(2008): 141–69.
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Asacrifice would be optimal in Wrinkle, the problem would resurface in
WrinkleDS. So long as concern for equality—or priority given to the worse
off—is merely weighted, even tiny benefits to the well-off will trump it,
provided that there are enough of them.14
The sufficiency view offers an appealing alternative. It holds that
what is morally important is that everyone should “have enough.”15 If
maintaining quality of life above a certain level has absolute priority, then
the sacrifice would not have the best result. There would be no need to
discount the future to avoid excessive obligation.16 Yet the sufficiency
view faces a severe objection: the “black hole problem,” or the “problem
of waste.”17 Many people suffer medical conditions that render their lives
seriously flawed or limited. “There can easily exist medical procedures,”
Arrow warned many years ago, “which are . . . so expensive as to reduce
the rest of the population to poverty.” So long as we can do anything to
ameliorate their condition, however minor, the sufficiency view will tell
us to accord them priority. Even in the case of incurable diseases, so long
as there is a chance that medical research could discover a way of curing
or mitigating them, we will have to do so before we do anything for those
who are better off.18 Long before we eliminate all illnesses, disabilities,
and risks, sufficientarian policies will drive everyone in society down to
the level where life is just barely good enough, and this will be the best
feasible outcome.19 The sufficiency view blocks the sacrifice in Wrinkle,
but it has counterintuitive implications of its own.14. Crisp, “Equality, Priority, and Compassion,” 754; T. M. Scanlon, “Replies,” Ratio 16
(2003): 424–39, 433.
15. The original formulation of the view, by Harry Frankfurt, stated this in terms of
people having enough resources, particularly money. Nevertheless, “some of [Frankfurt’s]
remarks seem to hint quite strongly at welfare,” as Robert Huseby observes, and this has
been the focus of most sufficientarian analyses. See Harry Frankfurt, “Equality as a Moral
Ideal,” Ethics 98 (1987): 21–43; and Robert Huseby, “Sufficiency: Restated and Defended,”
Journal of Political Philosophy 18 (2010): 178–97, 181 n. 11.
16. Matthew Rendall, “Climate Change and the Threat of Disaster: TheMoral Case for
Taking Out Insurance at Our Grandchildren’s Expense,” Political Studies 59 (2011): 884–99.
DominicRoser defends a nonconsequentialist version of this argument: “TheDiscount Rate:
A Small Number with a Big Impact,” in Applied Ethics: Life, Environment and Society (Sapporo:
Center for Applied Ethics and Philosophy, Hokkaido University, 2009), 10–25.
17. Huseby, “Sufficiency,” 186–87; Clark Wolf, “Intergenerational Justice, Human
Needs, andClimate Policy,” in Intergenerational Justice, ed. Axel Gosseries andLukasH.Meyer
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 347–76, 356–57, 366–67.
18. Kenneth J. Arrow, “Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls’s Theory of Justice,”
Journal of Philosophy 70 (1973): 245–63, 251; Mark S. Stein, Distributive Justice and Disability:
Utilitarianism against Egalitarianism (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 78, 187–
88; Karl Widerquist, “How the Sufficiency Minimum Becomes a Social Maximum,” Utilitas
22 (2010): 474–80.
19. Norcross, “Comparing Harms,” 59–60; Widerquist, “How the Sufficiency Mini-
mum.”
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AA final response would be to grant that the sacrifice would make
things go best but to deny that we would be obliged, or even permitted,
to bring about the best outcome. This is Rawls’s and Scanlon’s approach.
Scanlon maintains that our actions must be consistent with principles
“that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced
general agreement.” Agents can, on this view, reasonably reject principles
aggregating costs and benefits when the burden for themselves would be
grossly disproportionate. Thus, in theWorld Cup case, Jones could reason-
ably reject any principle that left him to suffer, whereas no soccer fan
could reasonably reject a principle requiring us to rescue Jones.20 Simi-
larly, we might think that we could reasonably reject any principle requir-
ing us to sacrifice 50 percent of next year’s income for the sake of prevent-
ing miniscule losses from climate change stretching far into the future.
Both Rawlsian contractualism and Scanlonian contractualism, however,
face the same problem as the sufficiency view. Why, we might ask, could
someone not reasonably reject a principle whereby society chose to treat
ten million people’s headaches instead of seeking a cure for her rare dis-
ease—particularly if she had been born with the ailment and had never
had even a chance of benefiting from this arrangement? And yet our so-
cietiesmake such decisions, and intuitively it seems permissible to do so.21
If these small gains for the many can outweigh large losses for the few, we
need some explanation of why this should be true within generations but
not, seemingly, between them. Can an appeal to agent-centered preroga-
tives provide one?
II. AGENT-CENTERED PREROGATIVES
Some have seen discounting as a way of capturing a prerogative to favor
our own generation’s interests over the general good. Most of us believe
that we can defensibly give some priority to ourselves and to those close to
us. Samuel Scheffler advocates recognizing an agent’s moral right “to as-
sign a certain proportionately greater weight to his own interests than to
the interests of other people.” Citing Scheffler’s “agent-centered prerog-
ative,”Arrow argues that the present generation can legitimately discount20. John Rawls, ATheory of Justice, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1999); Scanlon,What We Owe to Each Other, 153, 235–40. Rawls did not be-
lieve that his difference principle applied to relations between generations; Theory of Justice,
253–54.
21. James Griffin, Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement, and Moral Importance (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1986), 170–74. On Rawlsian contractualism and health care, see John Kekes,
“A Question for Egalitarians,” Ethics 107 (1997): 658–69, 666–67; Stein, Distributive Justice
and Disability, chap. 6; Allen E. Buchanan, “Health-Care Delivery and Resource Allocation,”
in Justice and Health Care: Selected Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 37–75, 63–
65. Cf. Norman Daniels, “Health Care Needs and Distributive Justice,” Philosophy and Public
Affairs 10 (1981): 146–79.
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Athe future, precluding any obligation to sacrifice everything for the sake
of others.22 Understood thus, pure time preference is not really based
on time, but rather on personal distance from the beneficiary.23 Each gen-
eration could accord greater weight to its own interests by a factor which
Scheffler calls “M.”24
Formulated thus, Scheffler’s argument cannot do the work that Ar-
row wants it to do. In the first place, if discounting reflects personal dis-
tance, then the standard approach to discounting—under which costs
and benefits receive less and less weight as they recede into the future—
is senseless. While we care more about our children and grandchildren
than about strangers, we do not attach many times as much weight to
the welfare of people who will live in one century as to the welfare of those
living two centuries fromnow.25 Second, while Scheffler doesnot statewhat
the value of M should be, or claim that it can be precisely specified, he
clearly intends this weighting to be limited. So long as discounting is un-
derstood as weighting, however, a large enough population of future peo-
ple—as inWrinkleDS—will always overwhelm it.26 More people would have
to benefit before we would be required to impoverish ourselves, but so long
as enough stood to gain, we would still have to make the investment. How
could Arrow’s argument be repaired to avoid the problem?
Here it will be helpful to consider two rationales for an agent-centered
prerogative. One is rule consequentialist and appeals to overall conse-
quences. Rule consequentialism, in its most plausible versions, requires
us to observe principles that collectively yield the best results. Part of the
costs and benefits of a moral code are its effects on our own feelings and
on our relationships with others. A code that required us to assign equal
weight to the welfare of strangers would be psychologically wrenching
and would require us to attach far less importance to much of what makes
our own lives worth living.27 An across-the-board duty to treat strangers’ in-
terests on a par with our own would also create a moral hazard. Such a
strong duty of assistance would discourage people from helping them-22. Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism: A Philosophical Investigation of the
Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions (Oxford: Clarendon, 1982), 20; Arrow,
“Discounting, Morality, and Gaming,” 16.
23. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 485.
24. Samuel Scheffler, “Prerogatives without Restrictions,” Philosophical Perspectives 6
(1992): 377–97, 378.
25. Martin L. Weitzman, “Why the Far-Distant Future Should Be Discounted at Its
Lowest Possible Rate,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 36 (1998): 201–
8, 201.
26. Duncan Purves, “The Case for Discounting the Future,” paper presented at the
workshop “Ethical Underpinnings of Climate Economics,” University of Helsinki, Novem-
ber 12, 2014, p. 5; see also Liam B. Murphy,Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2000), 64.
27. Parfit, On What Matters, 1:404.
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Aselves. Obligations of assistance must be limited to avoid these perverse ef-
fects. Rule consequentialism will thus license us to give ourselves and those
close to us some degree of preference. Let us call an agent-centered prerog-
ative that is justified in this fashion PRRC.
Scheffler, in contrast, does not claim that his prerogative will pro-
mote the best consequences, even in the long term. Rather, he defends
it as the natural consequence of the fact that “people do not typically view
the world from the impersonal perspective.”28 Agents, in this conception,
are not impartial optimizers. As Orwell remarked, “Many people genu-
inely do not wish to be saints.”While to treat others’ interests on a par with
one’s ownmay be worthy of praise, few people do, and certainly one is not
to be blamed if one puts a finger on the scales. But unless an action is
blameworthy, in one key sense it is not wrong.29 Let us call a prerogative
justified in this fashion PRPPV.
If an agent-centered prerogative can be justified in either fashion, we
can plausibly believe that it would be optimal tomake the sacrifice inWrin-
kle while denying that we would be morally obliged to make it. Consider
the following variation on Blue and the Many:2
2
Sonia
Brian
(2010
On W
ll use Mistake : The NHS can either cure Bill’s rare disease, sparing him
a year of severe pain, or treat the day-long migraine headaches of
ten million people. When Bill receives a letter from the NHS, he real-
izes that a computer glitch has led it to decide to treat his rare disease.We might accept that treating the headaches would be best, and that in
Blue and the Many the NHS ought to make this choice. Yet we may also
think that Bill would not be obligated to notify the NHS of its mistake.
Even if the NHS would be justified in imposing the best solution on Blue,
we could not reasonably expect Bill voluntarily to accept a year of torment
just to spare ten million strangers day-long headaches. Why?
On the first justification for an agent-centered prerogative, PRRC, for
Bill to be prepared to make the sacrifice inMistake would require self-
abnegation—essentially to regard himself as a means for maximizing im-
personal goodness. For us all to have such attitudes would render life
much less worth living. Bill is thus justified in regarding himself in a way
that leads him to reject the sacrifice inMistake. For us to be prepared to im-
poverish ourselves whenever it brought small benefits to enough rich peo-
ple would also require extreme self-abnegation. That too would greatly re-8. Scheffler, Rejection of Consequentialism, 62.
9. George Orwell, “Reflections on Gandhi,” in In Front of Your Nose: 1945–1950, ed.
Orwell and Ian Angus (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1968), 463–70, 467;
McElwee, “The Rights and Wrongs of Consequentialism,” Philosophical Studies 151
): 393–412; Stephen Darwall, “Agreement Matters: Critical Notice of Derek Parfit,
hat Matters,” Philosophical Review 123 (2014): 79–105, 97–98.
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Aduce human happiness. No plausible moral theory, so we might argue, will
demand it. Rejecting the sacrifice inWrinkle, on this rule consequentialist
view, would be a suboptimal act which was nevertheless justified by the op-
timal moral code.
On the second justification, PRPPV, Bill could justifiably keep mum
because the sacrifice would be his. Douglas Portmore claims that impar-
tiality in such a case would be downright irrational: “If . . . my choice is be-
tween saving my own life . . . and saving some stranger’s life, and the only
thing that speaks in favor of saving the stranger is that this would result in
there being one more utile overall, then it seems that I have not just suf-
ficient, but decisive, reason to save my own life.”30 If that is true where the
stakes for each party are equal, then surely it is true a fortiori when Bill
would lose so much more. But we need not go even this far. We can grant
that Bill rationally could make the sacrifice without holding that he is ra-
tionally required to do so.31 Likewise, we could not reasonably be expected
to make the sacrifice inWrinkle. We could argue that we could not be ex-
pected to impose harsh sacrifices on ourselves for the sake of people
who would in any case be much better off than we are.32
When would it be unreasonable on PRPPV to expect such a sacrifice?
T. M. Scanlon has famously proposed the concept of relevance. On this
view, aggregating costs and benefits is appropriate if and only if the sacri-
fices for the respective parties would be, so to speak, in the same ballpark.
If it is a matter of saving one person’s life or many people from total pa-
ralysis, then we might justifiably save the latter. But if it is a choice such
as the one inMistake, then the disadvantaged party can reasonably reject
a principle requiring the sacrifice, no matter how many stand to benefit.
That is true even if it would be impartially better to treat the headaches.
While the disadvantaged party might have greater impartial reason to ac-
cept a principle requiring her to make the sacrifice, Scanlon argues, “tak-
ing all reasons into account”—both impartial and agent-centered—she
can reasonably reject it. The numbers simply do not count.33
In Rawls-Scanlon cases, “we can either save one person from some
great burden, or give much smaller benefits to many other people, who
are all much better off.” We might think that both the much greater loss
the disadvantaged party would suffer and the fact that the others aremuch
better off make it permissible for her to reject it. Parfit shows that the for-30. Douglas W. Portmore, Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Ratio-
nality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 4.
31. Parfit, On What Matters, 1:382–88, 2:258–59.
32. Hilary Greaves, “Discounting for Public Policy: A Survey,” Economics and Philosophy
33 (2017): 391–439, 407.
33. Scanlon,What We Owe to Each Other, 239–40; T. M. Scanlon, “How I AmNot a Kant-
ian,” in Parfit and Scheffler, On What Matters, 2:116–39, 137; emphasis in the original.
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Amer consideration is irrelevant. Consider the following variation onMis-
take :343
3
136–4
3
J. J. C.
ll use Shared Pain: The NHS can either cure Bill’s rare disease, sparing
him a year of severe pain, or reduce the severe pain of Bill and ten
million other people from a year to ten months. When Bill receives
a letter from the NHS, he realizes that a computer glitch has led it to
decide to treat his rare disease.Here again, Bill has more to lose than the others. Informing the NHS will
cost him ten months of pain, while keeping mum will mean only two
monthsmore pain for the other tenmillion people. Nevertheless, he could
not reasonably reject a principle requiring him to do so. The reason that
Bill could defensibly reject the burden inMistake is not that his sacrifice
would be greater, but that it would leave him so much worse off than the
others.
III. SCANLONIAN AND KANTIAN CONTRACTUALISM
This raises a puzzle. Intuitively, Bill is under nomoral obligation to volun-
teer information to the NHS. Yet commonsense morality accepts that the
state can impose aggregative trade-offs in cases such as Blue and the Many.
Were Blue to resist such a decision—say, by hacking the NHS computers
to change it—the government would also be justified in forcing her to
stop. It appears, then, that the state can defensibly compel Blue to accept
a decision with which Bill would have no moral obligation to comply on
his own.
The justification for this conclusion under PRRC is straightforward.
Many policies, when imposed, place less strain on our moral willpower
than would the duty of voluntary compliance. Governments, as Thomas
Nagel points out, can justifiably collect taxes to help the poor, without
taxpayers beingmorally obliged to contribute voluntarily, because the lat-
ter “requires voluntary decisions that are quite difficult to make.”35 To vol-
unteer for the sacrifice inMistake orWrinkle—where the beneficiaries will
be better off—would be harder still. Plausibly, it would require a degree of
self-abnegation that it would be very bad to have.36 In Blue and the Many,
in contrast, Blue has no choice and need not screw herself up for a sacrifice
or diminish her self-esteem in the same way. On the logic of PRRC, the best4. For a similar example, see Parfit, On What Matters, 2:197–98.
5. Thomas Nagel, “Libertarianism without Foundations,” Yale Law Journal 85 (1975):
9, 145.
6. BernardWilliams, “ACritique ofUtilitarianism,” inUtilitarianism: For andAgainst, by
Smart andBernardWilliams (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1973), 116–17.
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Arules will instruct the state to impose some burdens that the losers would
not be obliged to accept of their own accord.
This conclusion is also implied by PRPPV. Some writers have objected
to Scheffler’s agent-centered prerogatives on the grounds that they would
permit “forced supererogation.” Schefflerian prerogatives permit the agent
to give greater weight to her own interests, thus allowing actions that are
impartially suboptimal. But since it is always permissible on Scheffler’s view
to take the impartially best action, it seems that his theory will allow one to
force others to behave optimally when doing so makes things go best. Some
commentators find this unacceptable.37 In turn, Scanlonian contractualism,
which admits that agent-centered reasons can justify rejecting some opti-
mific principles, is sometimes criticized for permitting too little aggrega-
tion.38 We saw earlier that it had trouble explaining how the NHS could
justifiably treat ten million headaches rather than pursuing a cure for some-
one’s rare and innate disease. Yet most of us accept that society can legiti-
mately impose such trade-offs. Moreover, Scanlon’s acceptance of agent-
centered reasons creates, as he himself notes, another problem: if every-
one can justifiably accord greater weight to her own interests, then it seems
we risk “a moral standoff, in which there is no right answer to the question
of what one should do.”39
Here is a solution. Scanlonian contractualism holds that we must act
consistently withprinciples that noone could reasonably reject. “Thedesire
to be able to justify one’s actions (and institutions) on grounds one takes to
be acceptable,” Scanlon notes, “is quite strong in most people. People are
willing to go to considerable lengths, involving quite heavy sacrifices, in or-
der to avoid admitting the unjustifiability of their actions and institutions.”
This criterion, Scanlon argues, offers themost phenomenologically plausi-
ble account of moral motivation.40 Here Scanlon equates a principle’s jus-
tifiability with its acceptability. Yet when choosing whether to grant or with-
hold assistance, we ask not whether others could accept our decision, but
whether we can justify it to ourselves. InMistake, Bill can hold that he is jus-
tified in keeping mum, on the grounds that he could reasonably reject a
principle requiring him to speak up.37. Bashshar Haydar, “Forced Supererogation and Deontological Restrictions,” Jour-
nal of Value Inquiry 36 (2002): 445–54; Eric Mack, “Prerogatives, Restrictions, and Rights,”
Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2005): 357–93; see also R. H. Myers, “Prerogatives and Re-
strictions from the Cooperative Point of View,” Ethics 105 (1994): 128–52, 144–48.
38. See, e.g., Alistair Norcross, “Contractualism and Aggregation,” Social Theory and
Practice 28 (2002): 303–14.
39. Scanlon, “How I Am Not a Kantian,” 138.
40. T. M. Scanlon, “Contractualism and Utilitarianism,” in Utilitarianism and Beyond, ed.
Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 103–28,
117; Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 187.
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AThat does not, on the other hand, block others from imposing such
sacrifices. On what Parfit calls Kantian contractualism, it is wrong to treat
people in a way that they could not rationally accept. We always have suf-
ficient reason to accept principles that lead to the impartially best out-
come.41 This suggests a distinction that neither Kant nor Scanlon draws
himself : Scanlonian contractualism governs what we owe to others, and
Kantian contractualism what we can justifiably do to others.42 Because
Bluewould be somuchworse off if we choose to treatmany people’s head-
aches instead of her year of pain, we should plausibly give this burden dis-
proportionate weight. But if, even after weighting, treating the headaches
remains the optimific choice, Blue could rationally accept it, and society
can justifiably impose it. As Roger Crisp observes, “The justification an
agent can offer for pursuing her own interests at the expense of the over-
all good is that these interests are hers. And, as Sidgwick recognised, it
does not strike us as unreasonable that an agent give some priority to
her own interests. But a similar claim, in support of an alleged constraint,
by a patient in some case where her interests may be sacrificed to the over-
all good lacks any plausibility. For the same point could be made by those
whose interests are also at stake and in conflict with hers.”43
An agent can reasonably reject some sacrifices in Rawls-Scanlon cases
that it would nevertheless be legitimate to impose. Though society can jus-
tifiably choose to treat the headaches in Blue and the Many, Bill is under no
obligation to adopt this decision of his own free will inMistake. Nor would
we have the duty to impose the sacrifice on ourselves inWrinkle. Neither
PRRC nor PRPPV, moreover, is sensitive to the number of people the sacrifice
would benefit. To be willing to make the sacrifice inWrinkle would require
a harmful degree of self-abnegation regardless of whether it would ben-
efit billions of rich future people, or hundreds of billions, or trillions. Nor41. Parfit, OnWhat Matters, 1:chap. 8, 16–17, 2:250–53. Here Parfit claims that we have
sufficient reason to accept principles that would make things go best if they were univer-
sally followed—or, on another version, accepted. Elsewhere, however, he rightly suggests
that principles should also be optimific however many people comply with them (1:317–19).
This implies that the right principles must actually make things go best.
42. This distinction solves a notorious problem for Scheffler’s prerogative: that it seems
to authorize not only doing less good than we might but also suboptimal acts of harm. Shelly
Kagan, “Does Consequentialism Demand Too Much? Recent Work on the Limits of Obliga-
tion,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (1984): 239–54, 251. Because we could reasonably re-
ject principles that required us to treat our own interests on a par with those of strangers,
Scanlonian contractualism will permit some omissions that are impartially suboptimal. But
since no one could reasonably accept principles allowing her to be treated in a way that was
both harmful and impartially suboptimal, Kantian contractualism will prohibit all such actions.
See Parfit, On What Matters, 2:251.
43. Roger Crisp, “The Dualism of Practical Reason,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
New Series 96 (1996): 53–73, 65–66; emphasis in the original. See also Parfit, On What Matters,
2:250–53.
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Acould this number make a difference to the strength of PRPPV. Unlike con-
ventional pure time preference, which is restricted to weighting, these pre-
rogatives justify absolute agent-centered preference within a limited scope.
When others will be in any case much better off, the preference for one’s
own interests can legitimately be absolute. In other contexts, it should
only be weighted.
IV. THE USE AND ABUSE OF AGENT-CENTERED PREROGATIVES
The foregoing arguments for absolute agent-centered prerogatives pre-
suppose that beneficiaries of the sacrifice will be in any case much better
off. To see this requirement’s intuitive plausibility, recallMistake. There
we argued that Bill could reasonably reject a principle that required him
tomake a great voluntary sacrifice for people who are much better off. Bill
would be justified in regarding benefits to these people as irrelevant to his
decision. Consider now the following:4
4
ll use Big Mistake : The NHS can either cure Bill’s rare disease, saving him
from a thousand days of severe pain, or use the same resources to pre-
vent the deaths of tenmillion people. When Bill receives a letter from
the NHS, he realizes that a computer glitch has led it to treat his rare
disease.This time, Bill should clearly speak up. Not only will saving ten million be
far better from an impartial point of view, but if he does not, he will forgo
the opportunity to prevent a harm that would leave its victims even worse
off than he is. While Bill still has a self-regarding reason to give greater
weight to his own suffering, it could not be as great as this. Likewise, even
defenders of conventional discounting admit that considerable sacrifice
would be justified to prevent climate change from impoverishing future
people.44
This analogy might be challenged. We might think that Bill has a
duty to his fellow citizens to speak up, but that mitigating climate change
is, in Schelling’s words, “very much like a foreign aid program, with some
of the foreigners being our owndescendants who live not on another con-
tinent but in another century.”45 Commonsense morality holds that it is
permissible to give greater weight to benefiting conationals than foreign-
ers, even if the latter are much worse off. Wemight think wemay also give
greater weight to benefiting our own generation. J. Paul Kelleher de-
scribes a case resembling Wrinkle :4. See, e.g., Nordhaus, Question of Balance, 147.
5. Schelling, “Intergenerational Discounting,” 397.
This content downloaded from 128.243.039.098 on May 10, 2019 06:03:37 AM
subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
4
Econo
4
ford:
4
Look
Bostro
Rendall Discounting, Climate Change, and the Ecological Fallacy 455
All use Volcano: All members of the present generation enjoy the present
average per capita consumption level of Americans today. A volcano
will erupt in 2200, permanently reducing everyone’s consumption to
the US per capita average of 1980. We can prevent the eruption, but
at the cost of reducing the consumption of each member of the pres-
ent and all future generations to the US per capita average of 1985.In this case the future people will not be better off than the present gen-
eration. Nevertheless, Kelleher suggests that “many will take the view that
members of the current generation may exercise Schefflerian prerogatives
to protect their own consumption levels, especially since they (ex hypothesi)
do not cause the volcanic eruption.”46
Perhaps many would. Still, in contrast toWrinkle, it does not seem ob-
viously unreasonable to hold that the present generationwould be obliged
to intervene.Moreover, the difference that interventionwouldmake inVol-
cano is small, and theUS living standard in 1980may strike us as quite good
enough in absolute terms. While intervening would be the impartially best
choice, it is hard to imagine anyone losing much sleep over condemning
future generations to the consumption level of 1980 rather than 1985. It
would be another matter if the volcano threatened to reduce future gener-
ations to destitution. Consider the following:Vicious Volcano: All members of the present generation enjoy the
present average per capita consumption level of Americans today.
A volcano will erupt in 2200, permanently reducing everyone’s con-
sumption to that of today’s Haitians. We can prevent the eruption,
but at the cost of reducing the consumption of each member of the
present and all future generations to the US per capita average of
1985.Clearly, PRRC will not authorize us to stand by. Any moral code that
makes things go best in the long run will surely insist that we intervene
against an irreversible catastrophe for humanity at modest cost to our-
selves.47 Schefflerian prerogatives, in contrast, typically permit agents to
give their own goals priority even when by acting otherwise they could save
many others from severe poverty. Nevertheless, Scheffler himself holds
that PRPPV has finite weight. Hundreds or thousands of times as many peo-
ple may live in the future as exist today.48 It is hard to believe that an agent-6. J. Paul Kelleher, “Pure Time Preference in Intertemporal Welfare Economics,”
mics and Philosophy 33 (2017): 441–73, 468.
7. Brad Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality (Ox-
Clarendon, 2000), 169.
8. If we avoid catastrophe, it could bemanymore than that. See Adrian Kent, “ACritical
at Risk Assessments for Global Catastrophes,” Risk Analysis 24 (2004): 157–68, 164; Nick
m, “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority,” Global Policy 4 (2013): 15–31, 18–19.
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Arelative prerogative could justify abandoning such large numbers to pov-
erty. If an American could single-handedly save a whole town from poverty
at the cost of reducing her living standard to that of 1985, surely it would
be wrong for her to refuse to do so. Nor ought the present generation to
reject the sacrifice inVicious Volcano. If Schefflerian prerogatives have lim-
ited weight, then catastrophic future losses should outweigh small costs in
the present. Scanlon’s criterion of relevance reinforces this conclusion.
Because personal interests help determine which principles agents can
reasonably reject, Scanlonian contractualism permits them to give some
extra weight to their own interests. But the damages inVicious Volcano would
affect so many people, and leave them so much worse off than we are, that
we could not reasonably reject principles requiring a modest sacrifice from
us to save them.
In the end, I doubt that many advocates of pure time preference
would claim we have an agent-centered prerogative to reduce future gen-
erations to poverty. Runaway climate change could leave distant future
generations poorer than we are. Even if they are richer, they may not be
better off. Severe global warmingmight so impoverish these people’s lives
that increased consumption could not compensate for the loss.49 Even if
we can permissibly give less weight to their welfare than our own, these
losses must not be discounted away.50
V. IS THERE A RISK?
Is there any reason toworry about such scenarios?Defenders of discounting
commonly argue that in spite of climate change, future people will be bet-
ter off than we are. Yet serious analyses that are optimistic about our ability
to manage global warming acknowledge some chance of catastrophe.51
RobertMendelsohnwrites that “future generations are likely to be wealthier
than current generations.” Bjørn Lomborg claims that emissions cuts will
“help people far into the future, where they will be much richer,” but even
he adds that “we are not helping a poor Bangladeshi in 2100 butmuch more49. Gardiner, Perfect Moral Storm, 176–77, 177 n. 48, 283–85, 326; Mathias Frisch, “Cli-
mate Change Justice,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 40 (2012): 225–53, 231–32, 238–40.
50. In Sec. III, I argued that while Scanlonian contractualism governs what we owe to
others, Kantian contractualism governs what we can do to them. While the former permits
a limited degree of agent-centered preference, the latter does not. It is tempting to argue
that since grave climate change damages would be worse both from an impartial perspective
and for the personal interests of future people, the latter could not rationally accept any dis-
counting of these damages. Such a claim, however, is complicated by the “nonidentity prob-
lem.”Ultimately, we seem on firmer ground in holding that even if some agent-centered dis-
counting of such damages can be justified, their impartial badness outweighs it. See Parfit,
On What Matters, 2:chap. 22.
51. See, e.g., Richard S. J. Tol, “Why Worry about Climate Change? A Research Agenda,”
Environmental Values 17 (2008): 437–70, 447, 450–51.
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Alikely a rather rich Dutchman.”WilliamNordhaus concedes that “we cannot
rule out the potential for catastrophic impacts that might justify trillions of
dollars of abatement costs,” before advising that “we should start with the
clear and present dangers, after which we can turn to the unclear and dis-
tant threats.”52
Should we? Weitzman’s influential warning about “bad tail” scenar-
ios prompted an exchange withNordhaus, who argued that for a catastro-
phe to materialize, the climate would have to prove improbably sensitive
to greenhouse gas emissions, the damages from climate change would
have to be improbably high, and scientists and governments would have
to remain improbably complacent in the face of danger signs.Weitzman’s
guesstimates of a 5 percent chance of more than ten degrees of warming,
or a 1 percent chance of more than twenty, were exaggerated.53 In so ar-
guing, Nordhaus implicitly granted that there was a small chance of catas-
trophe.Weitzman’s reply was noteworthy. Suppose, he wrote, that a policy
maker found Weitzman’s estimates and another economist’s less alarm-
ing ones equally credible. Thepolicymaker should giveWeitzman’s greater
weight: “Suppose one person advises you that a fire insurance policy pro-
tecting your house against extreme losses is unnecessary because so few
houses of your kind burn to the ground, while another person advises you
that a complete fire insurance policy is necessary in your case. Other things
being equal, should you flip a coin to decide what to do just because both
advisers seem to be giving equally credible guidance?”54
Here Weitzman made a simple but subtle point. There are two dis-
tinct mistakes we can make in such a case. One is to follow the “maxi-
probability method”—determine what is most likely to happen, and do
whatever will be optimal if it does. Policy debates sometimes take this ap-
proach for granted, but it is foolish.55 Nobody expects her house to burn
down next year. The maxiprobability method would tell us to save our
money andnot bother with insurance. Calculating expected value, in con-
trast, allows us to take unlikely contingencies such as house fires into ac-
count.56 Less widely recognized is that our probability estimates may be
wrong. In fact, this may pose a greater risk than does ignoring the small52. Robert Mendelsohn, “Is the Stern Review an Economic Analysis?,” Review of Environ-
mental Economics and Policy 2 (2008): 45–60, 52; Lomborg, Cool It, 55; Nordhaus, Question of
Balance, 147; emphasis added.
53. William D. Nordhaus, “An Analysis of the Dismal Theorem,” Cowles Foundation
Discussion Paper No. 1686 (New Haven, CT: Cowles Foundation for Research in Econom-
ics, 2009), http://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d16/d1686.pdf, 16–21.
54. Weitzman, “Fat-Tailed Uncertainty,” 291.
55. Sven Ove Hansson and Mikael Johanneson, “Decision-Theoretical Approaches to
Global Climate Change,” in International Politics of Climate Change: Key Issues and Critical Ac-
tors, ed. Gunnar Fermann (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997), 153–78, 164.
56. John Broome, Climate Matters: Ethics in a Warming World (New York: Norton, 2012),
chap. 7.
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Achance of a genuinely improbable disaster.57 Here the error is to adopt the
“my-favorite-theory approach”—in this case, assuming that a given set of
estimates is correct. Instead, we should assign subjective probabilities to
competing estimates (in Weitzman’s example, the house owner assigns
50 percent to each) and use these probabilities to weight the expected
value of the actions’ outcomes.58 Such probabilities can be hard to assess,
but we must do the best we can. Refusing to use them at all would be, as
Dominic Roser puts it, like “a visually impaired pilot closing her eyes on ac-
count of the impairment rather than using whatever impressions she can
glean from her limited eyesight.”59 We then choose the policy with the
highest intertheoretic expected value.60
Suppose that on an optimistic assessment there is one chance in a
hundred of more than ten degrees of warming, and we assign a subjective
probability of 90 percent to the optimists being right and only a 10 percent
probability to Weitzman’s guesstimate of one chance in twenty. The inter-
theoretic probability is 0.9  0.01 1 0.1  0.05—fourteen chances in a
thousand.61But evenwith themy-favorite-theoryapproach,whichwouldem-
ploy only the optimistic estimate, the expected loss from one chance in a
hundred of wrecking the earth’s climate is enormous, unless we discount
away the distant future.62 Can we justify doing so?
VI. AN ECOLOGICAL FALLACY
In a seminal 1995 paper, Schelling warned against a “fallacy of composi-
tion.”While future generations would probably be richer in the aggregate
than the present one, this did not mean that action by rich countries to
mitigate climate change would transfer resources from the poor to the
rich. The future residents of poor countries would likely still be poorer
than the residents of rich countries today.63 In fact, Schelling was describ-57. Toby Ord, Rafaela Hillerbrand, and Anders Sandberg, “Probing the Improbable:
Methodological Challenges for Risks with Low Probabilities and High Stakes,” Journal of
Risk Research 13 (2010): 191–205.
58. Ted Lockhart,Moral Uncertainty and Its Consequences (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2000), 42; Sven Ove Hansson, “Economic (Ir)rationality in Risk Analysis,” Economics
and Philosophy 22 (2006): 231–41, 233–36.
59. Dominic Roser, “The Irrelevance of the Risk-Uncertainty Distinction,” Science and
Engineering Ethics 23 (2017): 1387–1407, 1400.
60. Here I borrow terms from Brian Hedden, “Does MITE Make Right? On Decision-
Making under Normative Uncertainty,” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. 11, ed. Russ
Shafer-Landau (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 11:102–28.
61. For a similar example, see Ord, Hillerbrand and Sandberg, “Probing the Improb-
able,” 203.
62. Mariano Torras, “Orthodox Economics and the Science of Climate Change,”
Monthly Review 68 (2016): 25–34, 32.
63. Schelling, “Intergenerational Discounting,” 398.
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Aing an ecological fallacy, not a fallacy of composition.64 Somemembers of
future generations are likely to bemuch richer than the inhabitants of to-
day’s rich countries, but others will be poorer. Even if members of future
generations are richer on average, this is no reason to discount benefits
that would go to these worse-off people.65
Ironically, Schelling went on to commit an ecological fallacy of his
own. The real question, he argued, was not whether mitigation would
be progressive in its effects—it would—but whether the rich could do
as much good for the poor through mitigation as they would by devoting
the same amount of resources to helping today’s poor. “If GDP per capita
continues to increase in most of the developing world,” he wrote, “as I ex-
pect and as the optimizationmodels assume,marginal utilities of the ben-
eficiaries will be much higher during the first 50 years—before [green-
house gas] abatement benefits become significant—than in the second
50 years,” and still higher in the first years than the later ones. This being
the case, it would be “logically absurd to ignore present needs and concen-
trate on the later decades of the coming century”—or, presumably, the
centuries and millennia thereafter.66
Would it? Consider a new version of Mistake :6
what i
that w
6
count
6
ll use Vaccination: A computer glitch leads the NHS to decide to relieve
Bill’s thousand days of severe pain rather than give one chocolate
each to ten million healthy young adults. The chocolates contain
an oral vaccine designed to confer immunity to a virus which is cur-
rently making the rounds. The virus has a 1/100 chance ofmutating.
If it does, it will kill all ten million people.Bill might reason that he is very badly off and the others are expectedly
well off, even after taking into account the small chance that they will
all be killed by the virus.Hemight conclude that it would be unreasonable
to expect him to undergo great pain for people who are expectedly much
better off. That would be the wrong conclusion. If it were certain that the
other people would be much better off, Bill could reasonably refuse. But
while the others are expectedly better off, they might end up worse off. If
they do, it will be cold comfort that they would have been better off than
Bill in other possible states of the world. “Suppose that unbeknownst to
me someone flips a coin,” Hugh Lazenby writes, “with the expectation
that if it falls on heads I will be made the beneficiary of a vast fortune.4. The ecological fallacy is related to the fallacy of division—the assumption that
s true of the whole must be true of its parts. The fallacy of composition is to assume
hat is true of the parts must be true of the whole.
5. Marc Fleurbaey and Stéphane Zuber, “Climate Policies Deserve a Negative Dis-
Rate,” Chicago Journal of International Law 13 (2013): 565–95, 582.
6. Schelling, “Intergenerational Discounting,” 399–400.
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AThe coin falls on tails. What have I gained? I might have gained a lot. But
I have actually gained nothing. I do not experience what I might have
gained. I experience only what I have.”67 The same will be true for the
ten million here.
Instead, Bill should disaggregate the scenarios that could transpire.
In most possible states of the world, if Bill alerts the NHS, he will make a
great sacrifice that brings many well-off people trivial benefits (a yummy
chocolate). He can defensibly disregard these expected benefits. But in the
one hundredth scenario, if Bill keeps mum, he will have allowed ten mil-
lion deaths. Since there is one chance in a hundred that this scenario will
materialize, this amounts to the expected loss of one hundred thousand
lives. Bill has no excuse for disregarding these expected costs. If they mate-
rialize, he will be better off than the victims. Even if Bill can defensibly give
more weight to his own interests, it could not be as great as this.
Nor can we justify a similar gamble with climate change. As Schelling
advised, we must disaggregate future people into rich and poor. But we
must also disaggregate them into different possible states of the world.
When economists predict that despite climate change, future people will
be richer than we are, they mean one of two things: either that they will be
richer in the most likely scenario, or that they will be richer averaging
across all scenarios. Since it is obviously foolish to consider only the most
likely outcome, let us assume that they mean the latter. While in most of
their scenarios future people are richer, in some proportion, they are
poorer. If a bad scenario should materialize, that they were richer aver-
aged across all scenarios will be irrelevant.68 If there is only one chance
in a hundred of leaving the world’s population permanently impover-
ished, this still entails enormous expected impoverishment.The rich coun-
tries could bear the entire worldwide costs of stabilizing greenhouse gases
without imposing nearly comparable sacrifices onmost of their citizens. As
Schelling observed, were mitigation to cost 2 percent of world GDP, “the
doubled per capita income that might have been achieved by 2060 is
reached in 2062. If someone could wave a wand and phase in, over a few
years, a climate-mitigation program that depressed our GNP by 2 percent
in perpetuity, no one would notice the difference.”69 By failing to lower
their emissions, the inhabitants of the industrialized countries are taking
a small chance of leaving an enormous number of people worse off than
they are. There is no justification for discounting away these expected
losses.67. Hugh Lazenby, “Broome on Fairness and Lotteries,” Utilitas 26 (2014): 331–45, 341.
68. Dominic Roser and Christian Seidel, Climate Justice: An Introduction (Abingdon, UK:
Routledge, 2017), 77.
69. Thomas C. Schelling, “The Cost of Combating Global Warming: Facing the Trade-
offs,” Foreign Affairs 76 (1997): 8–14, 10; Bernward Gesang, Klimaethik (Berlin: Suhrkamp,
2011), 159–60.
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AVII. HOW TO DISCOUNT DEFENSIBLY
Not all treatments of discounting commit the ecological fallacy.Weitzman
argues that in choosing among investments we should discount distant fu-
ture effects at the rate we would use in the least optimistic scenario, since
“all of the other states . . . are relatively much less important now because
their present value has been reduced by the power of compound dis-
counting at a higher rate.”70 Yet with enough pure time preference, the
overall discount rate might still be positive, making catastrophic future
damages disappear. With any time preference that was short of absolute,
on the other hand, we would be obliged to make the sacrifice in cases like
WrinkleDS. Dale Jamiesonworries that “there seems to be noplausible value
for delta [the rate of pure time preference]. If the setting is 0 or extremely
low, the interests of the present are swamped by the future. If delta is set
high enough to protect the interests of present people, then the interests
of those who will live in the further future lose virtually all significance.”71
This article seeks to square that circle with an approach to pure time
discounting that complements Weitzman’s. Here is how it might be done.
First, assess the impartial value of a policy’s costs and benefits in each
growth scenario. When costs and benefits would go to people who will in
any event be much better off, disregard them—no matter howmany stand
to gain—unless they are cost-free to provide. Weight the remaining costs
and benefits by whatever degree of agent-centered preference we think ap-
propriate. Finally, multiply each scenario’s weighted value by its estimated
probability and sum them to obtain the policy’s expected value.72
Under this approach, there would be no obligation to make the sac-
rifice in Wrinkle or WrinkleDS, since here the future people are by stipula-
tion much better off than we are—richer, at any rate—and we can defen-
sibly ignore the benefits that the sacrifice would bring. Suppose, however,
that there is one chance in a hundred of our carbon emissions causing
global warming that so damages the planet that average welfare remains
significantly below that of the inhabitants of rich countries today. Assume
also that this would cause a collapse in world population—so that only
three billion people would live per century—and that the human race
would survive another one hundred thousand years. A simple calculation70. Weitzman, “Why the Far-Distant Future,” 205; for a helpful discussion, see Eric A.
Posner and David Weisbach, Climate Change Justice (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2010), 152–53.
71. Dale Jamieson, Reason in a Dark Time: Why the Struggle against Climate Change Failed—
and What It Means for Our Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 128.
72. In their discussion of an “ex post” approach to discounting, Simon Dietz and Geir
B. Asheim appear to be proposing something along these lines; “Climate Policy under Sus-
tainable Discounted Utilitarianism,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
63 (2012): 321–35, 325–26.
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Ashows that in just this scenario our emissions would entail the impoverish-
ment of an expected thirty billion people.73 Even if PRRC or PRPPV were to
permit some pure time preference, they could not justify discounting
such a catastrophe away. Low-probability catastrophic risks, some of which
might be rational to run if only our own lives were at stake, become inde-
fensible when they could permanently mar the planet.74
It might seem that the problem of overdemandingness will reemerge.
Nordhaus warns that if we were to attach infinite disutility to apocalyptic
risks, “we would likely drown in a sea of anxiety at the prospect of the infin-
ity of infinitely bad outcomes.” He suggests that with low discount rates it
could be rational to fight preventive wars to prevent possible power shifts
in the distant future.75 While it is true that nearly anything we do could
in principle prove catastrophic, in most cases we have no more reason to
believe that acting is riskier than abstaining. It is often more dangerous,
for example, to launch preventive wars than to forgo them. With climate
change, on the other hand, we have a well-theorized causal mechanism,
with good theoretical and empirical reasons for believing that higher
greenhouse gas concentrations are more dangerous than lower ones.76
There are a small number of other apocalyptic threats that fall into this cat-
egory—notably thermonuclear war—but for now there are not scores or
hundreds.77 With technological development, the number is likely to grow.
Yet in a nightmare world where such risks had proliferated, what could we
reasonably do but exercise extreme caution? Perhaps the problem is not
that giving world-wrecking threats their due is too restrictive, but that tech-
nological development is too dangerous. We should not take it for granted
that the story of industrialization has a happy ending.78 If century after cen-
tury we run such risks, sooner or later we will lose the gamble.7973. 1/100  100,000/100  3 billion 5 30 billion.
74. Olivier Godard, “The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change: Con-
tents, Insights and Assessment of the Critical Debate,” Surveys and Perspectives Integrating En-
vironment and Society 1 (2008): 17–36, 30.
75. Nordhaus, “Review of the Stern Review,” 697; William D. Nordhaus, “The Econom-
ics of Tail Events with an Application to Climate Change,” Review of Environmental Economics
and Policy 5 (2011): 240–57, 254.
76. Sven Ove Hansson, “Decision Making under Great Uncertainty,” Philosophy of the
Social Sciences 26 (1996): 369–86, 378; Richard K. Betts, “Striking First: A History of Thank-
fully Lost Opportunities,” Ethics and International Affairs 17 (2003): 17–24; Henry Shue,
“Deadly Delays, Saving Opportunities: Creating a More Dangerous World?,” in Climate
Ethics: Essential Readings, ed. Stephen M. Gardiner et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2010), 146–62, 154.
77. Weitzman, “On Modeling,” 13–14.
78. See Dan Lyons, “Are Luddites Confused?,” Inquiry 22 (1979): 381–403.
79. Bostrom, “Existential Risk Prevention,” 25; Nassim Nicholas Taleb et al., “The Pre-
cautionary Principle (with Application to the Genetic Modification of Organisms),” Ex-
treme Risk Initiative Working Paper Series (New York: New York University School of En-
gineering, 2014), https://arxiv.org/abs/1410.5787, 2.
This content downloaded from 128.243.039.098 on May 10, 2019 06:03:37 AM
ll use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Rendall Discounting, Climate Change, and the Ecological Fallacy 463
ANordhaus argues that thewillingness of contemporary societies to ac-
cept catastrophic risks such as those of nuclear winter or the destruction
of the earth by a particle accelerator, as well as their unwillingness to take
more than modest measures to ward off the threat of large asteroids, re-
veals that we attach limited weight to removing even the most apocalyptic
threats.80 If Nordhaus’s aim were to describe the policy priorities of exist-
ing societies, no sensible person could disagree with him. But he seems to
think that this tells us what we should do. Nordhaus would not, presum-
ably, hold that other economic policies that states adopt—say, slashing so-
cial welfare spending—are justified merely because voters support them.
To insist that the preferences of today’s consumers determine what we
should value is to accept that if the present generation desiredmassive fu-
ture death and suffering, there would be no value to preventing it, and in-
deed value in bringing it about.81 Nordhaus does not claim that we should
discount away damages to foreigners if we care about them less.What then
is the justification for discounting away damages to distant future gener-
ations?82
VIII. CONCLUSION
It is a mistake to assume that the future will be richer. Instead, we should
recognize that there are different possible futures, in some of which our
descendants are richer, and in others of which they are poorer. We can de-
fensibly ignore costs and benefits that would require sacrifices on behalf
of people who would be in any case much better off. That is not because
these benefits would have no value. Rather, it is because we could not rea-
sonably be expected tomake the sacrifice needed to produce them. At the
same time, cost-benefit analyses should give significant weight to the wel-
fare of everyone else. Given the vast number of people likely to live in the
future, this means averting any realistic danger of catastrophic damage to
the planet.80. Nordhaus, “Economics of Tail Events,” 253–54.
81. For a related point, see Simon Caney, “Human Rights, Climate Change, and Dis-
counting,” Environmental Politics 17 (2008): 536–55, 547–48.
82. Jamieson, Reason in a Dark Time, 125–26.
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